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ARTICLE
Protest or Riot?: Interpreting 
Collective Action in 
Contemporary France
John P. Murphy
Gettysburg College
ABSTRACT
Although both events were fundamentally acts of contestation led by 
different segments of France’s youth, the fall 2005 riots and the spring 
2006 CPE protests received very different treatment in French public 
opinion. Whereas the riots were overwhelmingly condemned, the pro-
tests were not only tolerated but also often celebrated. By examining 
dominant interpretations of these events circulated in the news media 
alongside those of young people collected during a year of fieldwork in 
the public housing projects of a medium-sized French city, this paper 
shines light on fundamental French values and beliefs about how society 
ought to work while also contributing to ongoing debates about the cul-
tural identity of such youth. More generally, it demonstrates the useful-
ness of comparison in the analysis of acts of political dissent. [Keywords: 
France, collective action, riots, protest, youth]
Introduction: A Tale of Two Conflicts
On October 27, 2005, a group of adolescents from Clichy-sous-Bois, a 
poorer town neighboring Paris, were walking home after spending the 
afternoon playing soccer at a nearby sports complex when a local resi-
dent, who claimed to see them loitering at a construction site, called 
the police. At the sight of an approaching squad car, the teenagers fled. 
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Most were quickly apprehended, but three evaded the police by ducking 
into a nearby electrical substation. This game of cat and mouse soon 
turned deadly when these three youths were electrocuted. Two died in-
stantly; the third was badly burned but managed to make it back home, 
where word of the electrocutions spread quickly. Outraged, neighbor-
hood youth descended on Clichy-sous-Bois’s streets that evening, 
torching cars, smashing store windows, and vandalizing bus stop shel-
ters. Despite police reinforcement, the disturbance escalated during the 
following days, spreading first to the outer fringes of Paris proper and 
then to urban peripheries across France before finally subsiding three 
full weeks later.
In response to the unprecedented scale of this destruction,1 then-
Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin proposed in January 2006 a re-
form measure aimed at combating higher-than-average unemployment 
rates among youth in France’s “outer cities,”2 a leading cause, Villepin 
maintained, of the unrest witnessed the previous fall. The CPE (Contrat 
Première Embauche),3 as the bill was called, proved widely unpopular 
among young people and others across France, who occupied schools, 
blockaded streets, and employed other tactics to voice their discontent. 
Faced by this massive opposition, Villepin was forced to retract the CPE 
the following April.
Although fundamentally both acts of contestation, the fall and spring 
events received very different treatment in French popular opinion: 
whereas the fall episode was widely condemned, the spring one was not 
only tolerated but also often celebrated. Labels used in the media reflect 
these divergent interpretations. At first, the most common term for the fall 
disturbance was “violent acts” (violences). Then, as the unrest spread, 
use of the word “riots” (émeutes) also became popular. By contrast, in 
the spring individual gatherings were called “demonstrations” (manifes-
tations), and together these were said to make up a “social movement” 
(le mouvement anti-CPE, or the “anti-CPE movement”). 
These labels suggest that one reason the French condemned the fall 
conflict (but not the events of the spring) has to do with perceptions of vi-
olence.4 The fall disturbance was, in fact, spectacularly violent: upwards 
of 10,000 cars were torched and over 200 public buildings—mostly 
schools, libraries, and gymnasiums—as well as a substantial number 
of private businesses were either severely damaged or destroyed. But 
this explanation is not entirely satisfying. The destruction caused by the 
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fall disturbance was contained geographically, occurring primarily in the 
perpetrators’ own neighborhoods and it mainly only involved attacks on 
property. Few people suffered injuries severe enough to require hospi-
talization and there were no direct casualties. The following spring, op-
position to the CPE sometimes entailed considerable violence as well, 
like the unruly confrontation between students and police that left the 
Sorbonne ransacked in mid-March or the gathering less than two weeks 
later in central Paris, during which cars were torched, stores were pil-
laged, police and firefighters were assaulted, and onlookers and partici-
pants were mugged.
What else then might account for the widely divergent value judg-
ments the French assigned to these two conflicts? Their labels for the 
events—particularly, the initial hesitation over what to call the fall dis-
turbance (“violent acts”)—compared to the decisiveness with which the 
CPE opposition was classified (“demonstrations,” “social movement”) 
point to another, perhaps, less obvious but analytically more rewarding 
explanation: in the French repertoire of forms of legitimate contestation, 
the spring event could be made to fit a recognizable model, but the fall 
one could not. In other words, in contrast to the spring CPE “protests” 
the fall “riots” were considered transgressive because they somehow 
overstepped the boundaries of what the French deem acceptable acts 
of contestation.
The word “transgression” conventionally implies a violation, the breach 
of some collectively understood limit or boundary. Mary Douglas’s (2007) 
classic work on purity and danger lays out the analytic usefulness of this 
idea. Building upon her notion of “matter out of place,” my aim here is 
to decipher, through a comparison of the fall 2005 “riots” and the spring 
2006 CPE “protests,” the ways the French distinguish between accept-
able and unacceptable collective displays of disruptive behavior.
The fall 2005 disturbance has received a great deal more scholarly 
attention than the spring 2006 conflict, owing undoubtedly to its resis-
tance to be classified as an acceptable form of contestation. Authors on 
both sides of the Atlantic have mostly interpreted the unrest in France’s 
outer cities by making claims about a collapse of certain forms of so-
cial integration and the concomitant exclusion of certain categories of 
people.5 Whereas these observers treat the fall disturbance as a singular 
event—the acting-out of marginalized people in response to their mar-
ginalization—I want to take another step back to examine this incident’s 
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relationship to a whole class of events through a comparison with an-
other event—the CPE conflict—that was similar in some ways, different 
in others.6 The CPE conflict, like the fall disturbance, concerned a seg-
ment of France’s youth and drew as much public attention at the time, 
but it was not as worrisome to people then and seems to be fading much 
more quickly from collective memory today. In the end, tracing out what 
gets classified as transgressive (or not) and why, as well as how people 
draw that line, should help to illuminate how they organize their social 
world. This can, in turn, throw light on shared as well as conflicting val-
ues within French society, and help define the contours and constituents 
of power differentials. More generally, this approach should demonstrate 
the value of using comparison to interpret acts of dissent defined as 
transgressive in any setting.
My analysis draws primarily on data collected during a year of eth-
nographic field research, beginning in September 2005, among young 
people living in large-scale public housing projects on the outskirts of the 
medium-sized French city of Limoges. Daphne Berdahl (1994:14) has re-
marked that “[e]thnographic fieldwork, like most research, is often a mat-
ter of structured serendipity.” To say that this observation applies to my 
own experience is something of an understatement. My project sought 
to examine outer-city youth’s interpretations and uses of media—and 
especially the mostly negative representations of outer-city areas and 
their residents that periodically appear in the French news—as a tool 
for illuminating how they position themselves and others within French 
society. Both the fall and spring conflicts attracted considerable media 
attention, much of it focused on so-called struggling youth (jeunes en 
difficulté) from the outer city. So, the timing afforded me a remarkable 
opportunity to do just that.
Comparing and contrasting the perspectives of my interlocutors in 
the outer city with what might be called “mainstream” or “dominant” 
views presented in the local and national media at the time, I argue here 
that claims about supporting the general interest constitute a potent le-
gitimizing force when it comes to classifying collective acts of dissent 
in France. This in turn exposes fundamental French values and beliefs 
relating to how society ought to be and its members ought to behave—
values and beliefs shared not only by journalists, politicians, and others 
conventionally thought to belong to the mainstream, but also my outer-
city interlocutors. I am working from the premise that where people share 
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the same terms for drawing distinctions between what is considered “in 
place” and “out of place” (or legitimate and illicit)—even though they 
may not agree on the application of these terms—this can be interpreted 
as meaning they share a culture in some sense.
Researchers have long argued that the second- and third-generation 
French descendants of non-European immigrants (mainly North-African, 
but also Antillean, Sub-Saharan African, and Turkish) have overwhelm-
ingly assimilated to the cultural norms dominant in France (e.g., Tribalat 
1996). However, when unrest breaks out in multi-racial and multi-eth-
nic outer-city areas, as it did in the fall of 2005, old debates about this 
seemingly resolved question are frequently reactivated. Reflecting on 
the origins of the fall 2005 conflict, for example, literary theorist Tzvetan 
Todorov blamed the “machismo” of Muslim youth. Whereas Hélène 
Carrère d’Encausse, permanent secretary of the French Academy, sug-
gested that the polygamous marital practices of Muslim immigrants from 
West Africa were responsible. Gérard Larcher, then-French Employment 
Minister, seemingly agreed, telling the British media that he was not sur-
prised that young men from polygamous (and therefore supposedly dys-
functional) families had trouble finding work in France. 
To be fair, none of these individuals has credentials in the sociology 
of France’s outer cities.7 By contrast, those who do have predominantly 
argued that the fall 2005 disturbance had far more to do with social and 
economic marginalization, spatial segregation, and anti-immigrant rac-
ism than any putative cultural difference (e.g., Cesari 2005). Nonetheless, 
a growing body of scholarship by mainly American researchers (e.g., 
Beriss 2004, Bowen 2010, Chapman and Frader 2004, Silverstein 2004) 
has suggested that immigrant activists are currently engaged in a semi-
nal project of redefining the parameters of the French nation rather than 
simply assimilating into traditional models of national identity, with the 
result being a sort of “creolization” of France (Beriss 2004:133). Whether 
or not such claims are empirically well founded, they tell us little about 
the expectations and experiences of ordinary youth in France’s outer cit-
ies. How do these young people position themselves and others in terms 
of national and cultural identity?
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Fieldwork in a French Outer City
As has been noted, surprisingly few anthropologists have written on 
the fall 2005 unrest in France, and those who have (e.g., Fassin 2006, 
Ossman and Terrio 2006, Silverstein and Tetreault 2006, Terrio 2006) 
have mostly based their analyses on data collected from interactions 
with adults (and especially agents of law and order) who are in contact 
with outer-city youth, rather than such young people themselves.8 By 
contrast, my data, collected during 12 months of ethnographic field re-
search, directly captures the experiences and perspectives of at least 
some of the young people living on the outskirts of Limoges.
Located in the central Limousin region, Limoges is best known for 
its fine china and, to a lesser extent, its leather and paper trades—but 
certainly not its outer-city housing projects.9 Limoges was, however, a 
strategic choice. Despite its lack of large-scale industry, the city has 
a significant and well-documented working class history, grounded in 
a deeply-rooted left-wing tradition, dating back at least to the French 
Revolution, and resulting in a precocious labor movement (Corbin 1975, 
Merriman 1985).10 This leftist tradition spurred the construction of a mul-
titude of worker housing developments beginning as early as the first 
decades of the 20th century. Today, a number of large-scale housing 
projects (some with more than 1,500 units and one boasting more than 
2,500 units) circle the city. And because Limoges was never the site 
of heavy industrial manufacture, the effects of deindustrialization have 
been less significant there; a sizeable working population remains, with 
little out-migration of young people from what might be called “blue col-
lar” backgrounds (Duplouy 2003:14). Finally, on a more pragmatic level, 
the size of Limoges was manageable for ethnographic research. With a 
population of roughly 140,000, the city provided an urban environment, 
but was small enough to allow easy access to the local people in a posi-
tion to facilitate my work, including, most notably, the city’s many social 
service providers.
Although my project focused on young people aged 16 to 25 in the 
process of transitioning between school and the working world, my first 
contacts in Limoges were social workers and case managers, outreach 
workers (éducateurs) and employment counselors, association leaders 
and program coordinators. With the help of these social service pro-
viders, I identified entry points into three of the largest housing proj-
ects. These included a municipally funded “dry” bar (bar sans alcool) 
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that also serves as a youth information center, a “youth house” (maison 
des jeunes) that aids in the coordination of leisure activities, and an after 
school homework-help center where I volunteered several days a week. 
Through these associations and organizations, I was able to meet many 
local youth and, thanks to their social networks, I was eventually able to 
expand my base of informants to include young people who might not 
necessarily frequent any of these establishments.
France’s urban peripheries tend to be ethnically diverse, including 
both immigrants and their descendants and “Franco-French” people. 
Limoges does not constitute an exception in this regard.11 My interlocu-
tors in the housing projects included roughly as many young people with 
deep roots in France as children of immigrants. I collected data through 
participant observation: I hung out at bars and cafés, I made trips to the 
unemployment office and sat in on meetings with employment counsel-
ors, I attended neighborhood festivals and concerts, watched television, 
listened to music, and went to the movies. I also conducted “life history” 
narratives with 33 young people I came to know quite well. During these 
more formal taped interviews, I asked youth to discuss family life and 
childhood, school and employment experiences, and plans for the fu-
ture. Because I undertook these interviews during the last few months of 
my fieldwork period, I was able to ask respondents to reflect critically on 
the fall and spring events from a distance. What they had to say greatly 
enriched the data that I collected during the heat of these two conflicts.
A French Model of Public Contestation
Since at least the Revolution of 1789, public displays of contestation have 
punctuated French life, and over time a familiar genre has developed—one 
centered on the principle of orderly disorder. For example, general strikes 
are called with the intention of disrupting public life: mass transportation is 
shut down, schools are closed, mail service is suspended, and so on. But 
such actions are carried out within a well-defined frame. The announce-
ment of the intention to strike is made by established unions with clear 
spokespersons and a well-disciplined membership, and it is generally is-
sued well in advance, allowing those who might be affected by it to plan 
accordingly. Further, essential services are often maintained, albeit at a re-
duced rate. In the case of public transportation, for example, one train out 
of three might continue to run. Such moments of contestation also tend to 
Protest or Riot?: Interpreting Collective Action in Contemporary France
984
be highly managed and supervised. Law enforcement officials are alerted, 
streets are closed to traffic, and union representatives flank gatherings, all 
in an effort to maintain public order and safety.
Such orderly disorder potentially carries many legitimizing refer-
ences to the past. Throwing up barricades, tossing pavement bricks or 
Molotov cocktails, and other like acts of contestation may conjure up the 
Revolution, the Commune, or May 1968, for example. Of course, acts of 
contestation may take on competing or evolving meanings and degrees 
of importance over time. May 1968, for example, has variously been 
described as a dress rehearsal for an imminent revolution (Bensaïd and 
Weber 1968), the founding moment in a march toward narcissistic indi-
vidualism (Ferry and Renault 1988, Lipovetsky 1983), and a force further-
ing the dominance of capitalism (Debray 2008). Notwithstanding such 
conflicting accounts (which tend to be as much about contemporary 
interests and concerns as a reflection of the historical record) in the pop-
ular imaginary moments of collective contestation (like May 1968, but 
also the Revolution and the Commune) are generally perceived as leg-
endary events that have fundamentally positively shaped the contours of 
modern French society on multiple planes (government structuring and 
purview, social equality, gender roles, etc.). Taking to the streets in col-
lective opposition to an aggressive, unjust, or wrong-headed regime in 
power can thus be readily managed as an action completely within the 
mainstream of the oldest and most quintessentially French traditions.
Familiar in form and with well-recognized historical antecedents, this 
genre of contestation has also become familiar in content, most often 
involving claims about the general interest. Emphasis on the individu-
al’s relationship to the collectivity in France can be traced back to at 
least the 1870s when the Third Republic’s architects drew explicitly on 
Enlightenment ideals out of concern both to include and to incorporate 
France’s regional diversity (Azéma and Winock 1970, Nord 1995, Weber 
1976). In 1882 at the Sorbonne, French philosopher Ernest Renan deliv-
ered his famous speech “What Is a Nation?” Stressing what he saw as 
the fundamental universality of humanity, he repudiated the idea that na-
tionhood is based on commonalities of race, language, religion, or even 
culture. Instead, Renan insisted that nations are forged through acts of 
common consent, reflecting “the clearly expressed desire to continue 
a common life” (2001:175). Central to this understanding of the nation 
is the Rousseauian notion of the social contract, which, far from being 
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relegated to obscurity as the distant ponderings of an Enlightenment 
thinker, is very familiar and more or less taken-for-granted in France to-
day (Epstein 2011). “Some form of association,” Rousseau wrote, “must 
be found as a result of which the whole strength of the community will be 
enlisted for the protection of the person and property of each constitu-
ent member, in such a way that each, when united to his fellows, ren-
ders obedience to his own will, and remains as free as he was before… 
The Social Contract,” Rousseau concluded, “provides the solution” 
(1964:180). In this instance, the general interest is considered to be both 
synonymous with and greater than each member’s individual interest. 
Individuals agree to join the polity and to participate in the construction 
of its common life because of the range of social protections they can 
expect to enjoy in return.
Reflecting this logic, what comes to be considered legitimate contes-
tation in contemporary France may begin with a particular group’s griev-
ances, but these are apt to be portrayed as shared by society more gen-
erally. For example, in May 1968, what began as isolated street battles 
between students and the police in Paris’s Latin Quarter ultimately re-
sulted in ten million workers, mobilized by France’s leading labor unions, 
picketing across the country. The dominant theme was the need for a 
complete reorganization of modern society in order to break down hier-
archical structures and provide greater opportunities for participation. 
Similarly, in November and December 1995, railway workers who were 
protesting a new government measure that stripped them of the right 
to early retirement were joined by postal workers, schoolteachers, and 
many others. Once again, well-organized unions with clearly identifiable 
leadership and well-articulated goals played a fundamental role. Despite 
the inconveniences posed by the nearly complete shutdown of public 
transportation that resulted, the media consistently reported that over-
all public support remained firmly with the strikers, with large numbers 
of people displaying solidarity by sharing rides, using bikes, and walk-
ing to get where they needed to go. The issue at stake was not merely 
the question of early retirement for one segment of the population, but 
rather the perception that the current government was whittling away 
at the principle of providing a wide array of social benefits to all French 
citizens or residents. This same concern was expressed in fall 2010, 
when public uproar greeted another government initiative, also targeting 
retirement age. Like the 1995 conflict, disparate groups, including oil 
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workers, truckers, and teens, banded together under the banners of dif-
ferent unions to block (this time unsuccessfully) the unpopular proposal.
Such public support does not appear to be contingent on the contesta-
tion’s being nonviolent. May 1968 offers a clear example of publicly sanc-
tioned violent demonstration, but so too do many recent farm protests. 
José Bové, the leader of the farmers union Confédération Paysanne, was 
convicted of ransacking a McDonald’s fast food restaurant in 1999. Far 
from attracting the disfavor of most French people, Bové was celebrated 
as a national hero. Following his sentencing, he drove to prison at the head 
of a convoy of tractors vigorously applauded by onlookers, then-Prime 
Minister Lionel Jospin lauded him as a “strong, vigorous personality,” and 
the popular media praised him for his willingness to go to jail for the found-
ing ideals of the Republic (Ariès and Terras 2000). Other destructive forms 
of farmer protest, like hurling cabbage into the ocean or dumping cow 
manure in front of government offices, have similarly garnered broad pub-
lic support. They, like Bové’s efforts, have been organized and claimed by 
farmers unions (usually FNSEA) and have also been seen as contributing 
to the collective good, each being interpreted as an attempt to safeguard 
France’s national dignity and well-being by protecting its food and agri-
culture from the perceived nefarious effects of free-market forces (Rogers 
2000, Thompson 2003).
The CPE and the Defense of the Collective Good
The spring 2006 opposition to the CPE, the government’s proposed 
youth employment reform measure, clearly fit this model of public con-
testation. A number of general strikes were called by the main national 
students’ union (UNEF) and all of the main trade unions (CGT, CFDT, FO, 
CFTC), each one announced at least a week in advance. Bruno Julliard, 
chairman of UNEF, emerged on the national stage as a leader of the pro-
tests. In Limoges, as elsewhere in France, there was a substantial police 
and union presence during all major marches and rallies. Claims and 
counterclaims about how the CPE served or undermined the collective 
good also frequently surfaced. A spring 2006 interview between Claire 
Chazal, the weekend news anchor of France’s popular Channel One 
television network, and then-Prime Minister Villepin offers a particularly 
illustrative example. Although Chazal and Villepin expressed opposing 
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views on the CPE, they both claimed the moral high ground in terms of 
defending the general interest.
On Sunday, March 12th, 2006, then-Prime Minister Villepin made a 
special appearance on the eight o’clock evening news to defend the 
CPE. This easy-hire, easy-fire employment contract, designed to spur 
employers to take on young people safe in the knowledge that they would 
not be bound by France’s rigid labor laws, had already provoked weeks 
of conflict, including walkouts by high school and university students 
and no less than two days of major rallies across France. On March 10th, 
upwards of 300 students had staged a sit-in at the Sorbonne, which 
ended during the early hours of the following morning with their forceful 
removal. Shaky footage broadcast by the news media that afternoon 
showed out-of-control student protestors clashing violently under cover 
of night with helmeted, baton-wielding, tear-gas-canister throwing riot 
squads. Responding to these troubling images, Villepin pled the CPE’s 
case and, in the process, attempted to portray the students’ opposition 
to it as misguided, arguing that the CPE was not intended for them, but 
for “struggling youth” (jeunes en difficulté) from France’s outer cities. “So 
you mean to say,” Chazal probed, “that you are not addressing these 
university students whom we’ve seen demonstrating?” Carefully choos-
ing his words, Villepin responded:
[The CPE] is meant for those who have the most trouble gaining 
access to work, those who go from short-term job to short-term 
job, from periods of training to periods of temporary work, those 
who are unable to find stable jobs for years at a time, those who 
aren’t offered any jobs at all. We had a crisis in our public housing 
projects, we’re quick to forget, a crisis in our public housing proj-
ects, several months back. Unemployment among youth living in 
public housing is between 40 and 50 percent. What’s our response 
to those young people? That’s the question we have to answer 
this evening. Listening to what some people have said, you’d think 
that everything is fine, that we needn’t change a thing. Youth un-
employment is at 23 percent, 40 percent among those who lack 
degrees. So, confronted by this risk of precariousness (précarité), 
what should we do? Do we stand with our arms crossed, like we’ve 
done for so many years? Do we look the other way? Or, do we seek 
solutions? I’ve proposed the CPE.
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According to Villepin, the opposition the CPE faced was illegitimate be-
cause the measure addressed the problem of a particular group (disen-
franchised youth living in outer-city housing projects), and it was in the 
general interest to do so.
Chazal squarely disagreed, but also based her position on a commit-
ment to the collective good. Siding with the students, she argued that far 
from combating the social exclusion12 of a few, the CPE risked increas-
ing it for many. “[This measure amounts to a] chipping away at our social 
model…violating in a certain way our tradition of social protections, and 
that’s very difficult to accept,” she fired back.
Chazal’s view was loudly echoed in the news media. In Limoges, for 
example, the idea that the CPE constituted a significant step away from 
France’s social welfare model toward a more laissez-faire type of capital-
ism was widely embraced by the local press, which unambiguously de-
nounced the measure, suggesting that it would undoubtedly generalize 
the problem of social exclusion in France.13 Some of the more mocking 
nicknames for the CPE, like “contrat précarité exclusion” (contract for 
precariousness and exclusion) and “contrat poubelle embauche” (trash-
can hiring contract), which peppered news coverage of city demonstra-
tions, are an indication of this stance.
Reporting in Limoges also tended to focus on the theme of the nation-
al collectivity, suggesting that solidarity among all members of French 
society was the best defense against social exclusion. According to 
most news accounts, the anti-CPE movement forged solidarity across 
generations, bringing together people at all life stages—students, work-
ers, retirees. Le Populaire du Centre, one of the dailies widely read in the 
city, made this point explicit. Following the first major demonstration in 
February, a headline in block letters across the paper’s front page pro-
claimed: “All generations stand up to the ‘institutionalization of job inse-
curity.’” The article that followed stressed that high school and university 
students had not marched alone; there were also “hundreds of workers 
and union members…and hundreds of retirees, reaffirming their commit-
ment to intergenerational solidarity” (Bourgnon 2006, emphasis added). 
Another article, published in the other well-read daily, L’Écho de la Haute 
Vienne (Catus 2006b), similarly claimed that “everyone,” including “trade 
union members” and “youth,” opposed the CPE.
Beyond explicit emphasis on solidarity within the national collectivity, 
news accounts implied a sort of cohesion among members of France’s 
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younger generation. Through liberal use of the catchall term “jeunesse” 
(youth), the popular media suggested that the mostly middle class high 
school and university students who took to the streets against the la-
bor contract represented all French youth. For example, one local news 
headline exclaimed, “La jeunesse replies, ‘Resistance!’” (Catus 2006c). 
The corresponding article, however, reported on a vote held the previous 
day by university students to continue striking, even after Villepin had 
promised to retract the CPE. As we shall see, such homogenizing ac-
counts proved troubling for many of my interlocutors, who by and large 
drew lines between themselves and the students involved in the CPE 
protests.
The Fall Disturbance: An Attack on the General Interest?
In contrast to the CPE conflict, the fall disturbance could not easily be 
made to fit the model of public contestation laid out above, as various 
French scholars’ reflections on it suggest. In his contribution to an on-
line forum, political scientist Stéphane Dufoix (2005) remarked, “[T]he 
first difficulty is to decide into which kind of frame [the fall disturbance] 
could—or should—find [its] place.” The possibilities, he suggested, are 
numerous, including urban policy, violence, republicanism, and immigra-
tion, among many others. Dufoix ultimately settles on the encompassing 
“issue of recognition.” But he, like a number of French researchers (e.g., 
Wieviorka 2005), rejects the idea that the fall conflict constituted any kind 
of “social movement,” “revolt,” or “revolution,” noting that no articulated 
voice emerged among its participants. Other French academics have 
been less categorical. Although he underscores the absence of politi-
cization during the fall event, Olivier Roy (2005), for instance, highlights 
the importance of a collective identity based on sharing similar positions 
within a social hierarchy, describing the disturbance as a “youth under-
class uprising.” Didier Lapeyronnie (2006) goes a step further, insisting 
that the fall conflict was fundamentally political even if it lacked union 
representation. He argues that the violence observed demonstrated an 
intimate understanding of the mechanisms of French models of social 
contestation and functioned as a type of “collective voice” that short-cir-
cuited inaccessible and often protracted democratic channels, enabling 
its “working class” participants to achieve swift political gains in the form 
of national, and even international, media recognition.
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The lack of consensus among French scholars over how to classify 
the fall event helps to illustrate what, according to the French more gen-
erally, the transgressed boundaries were. In all of these accounts, re-
gardless of the conclusions reached, the absence of articulated goals, 
identifiable leadership, and an institutional frame seems key. As dis-
cussed above, we can conclude that these are the crucial elements in 
acceptable “orderly disorder,” as understood in France.14 Claims in sup-
port of the general interest go hand in hand with these elements, and, in 
this respect, the fall disturbance was often portrayed as deficient, as in a 
televised speech made by then-President Jacques Chirac at the height 
of the fall unrest.
During the eight-o’clock evening news on November 14th, 
2005, after 17 consecutive nights of unrest in some of France’s out-
er cities, the President of the Republic finally addressed the nation. 
Uncharacteristically bespectacled and noticeably haggard,15 he pro-
jected a profound sense of dismay—dismay over violence, he admitted, 
that he struggled to comprehend. “This is a crisis,” Chirac maintained, “a 
crisis of meaning, a crisis of values, a crisis of identity.”
Much of what the President had to say that evening seemed to be 
an attempt to make sense of the situation. It was common knowledge 
that local outrage over the accidental electrocution of teenagers in a 
poorer neighborhood outside of Paris had triggered the unrest. Chirac 
expressed sympathy for all of the victims and their families. But he also 
suggested that there were other underlying causes. The President ac-
knowledged the challenging situation many young people in the hous-
ing projects face: they live in “rough neighborhoods,” he reasoned, that 
have “fewer resources than other areas” and are plagued by “violence,” 
“drug dealing,” and “out-of-control unemployment.” Some are “over 
their heads in debt,” he continued, and many lack the basic education 
needed to find good jobs or, frequently, any jobs at all. The risk of social 
exclusion for this segment of the population, Chirac concluded, is great. 
And this, he admitted, undoubtedly rouses frustration.
But as much as Chirac said he could empathize with the young of-
fenders, their actions remained for him irrational, the mark of a “deep 
malaise.” If the extent of property destruction was shocking, even more 
disturbing in Chirac’s estimation was that it had occurred in these youth’s 
own neighborhoods, putatively marking the progression of a new form 
of corrosive individualism that threatened the cohesion of the national 
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community. Other observers in France shared Chirac’s dismay. Some 
news commentators, for example, implied that the destruction would 
have made far more sense had it occurred in the bastions of bourgeois 
or official Paris. At least then it could have been explained in terms of 
class struggle or perceptions of social injustice. That it targeted nursery 
schools and community centers in the very neighborhoods where the 
rioters lived was, to them, utterly incomprehensible.
In response to the destruction, Chirac extended the state of emergen-
cy that had been issued and promised improvements in outer-city areas, 
including better housing and increased access to jobs. He encouraged 
parents to bear their share of responsibility, urging them to exercise au-
thority over their children and instill necessary “values” and “points of 
reference.” Ultimately, though, he called on each individual to embrace 
membership in the national community: 
Adherence to the law and to the values of the Republic is neces-
sarily achieved through justice, fraternity, and generosity. This is 
what it means to belong to a national community. It is in words and 
perspectives, with one’s heart and by one’s actions that we show 
the respect to which everyone is entitled…We will never build any 
enduring thing without respect. We will never build any enduring 
thing if we allow to rise—from wherever they may come—racism, 
intolerance, insult, or abuse…We must be proud to belong to a 
community that promotes, through considerable effort, the prin-
ciples of equality and solidarity. It is a privilege to belong to the 
French community. Each individual must understand this and act 
accordingly…Let us be clear-sighted. Let us be courageous. We 
must learn all the lessons of this crisis. Each individual must obey 
the rules. Each individual must know that he cannot violate the law 
with impunity. But we must also know how to gather together to act 
with faith in the principles that make France: as a result, the entire 
national community will emerge stronger.
By invoking such a collective ideal founded on each individual’s reso-
lute commitment to the national community’s well-being, this speech 
deftly shifted blame away from society as a whole or even the current 
administration, placing it squarely on the shoulders of the young offend-
ers.16 Far from making an effort to partake in or even reorder the national 
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community, Chirac presented them as literally attacking their own corner 
of it. As a result, in his view they could be held mostly responsible for the 
very social exclusion that had led them to riot in the first place.
Riots and Protests Reconsidered: Perspectives from 
Limoges’s Outer City
As “matter out of place,” what exactly constitutes transgression is, of 
course, a question of perspective. Drawing boundaries between accept-
able and unacceptable behavior entails the continual assertion of value 
and the making of choices. So far, I have focused on views presented 
by journalists and politicians in the national and local media, which do 
not necessarily correspond to the ideas people on the ground hold. 
Certainly, the youth I came to know in Limoges’s public housing projects 
sometimes offered different interpretations of both the fall and spring 
events. Although this could indicate some sort of cultural “otherness,” 
whereby they do not fully embrace dominant French values and beliefs, 
such a conclusion would be hasty at best. Exploring these youth’s indi-
vidual and collective definitions of transgression at the time of the fall 
and spring conflicts, but also during everyday life more generally, reveals 
their internalization of French ways of thinking and being—notably their 
understanding of the legitimizing powers of claims collectively put for-
ward in support of the general interest, as opposed to the corrosive ef-
fects attributed to individualist motivations and actions.
Apart from some isolated incidents involving trash can fires and a few 
torched cars, little disturbance took place in Limoges even as unrest 
raged elsewhere in France in the fall of 2005. My interlocutors in the 
housing projects did, however, intently follow the disturbance, primarily 
from the vantage point offered by the national media. Although nearly all 
of them condemned the violence, their interpretations of the conflict var-
ied depending on whether or not they themselves identified with the riot-
ers.17 Because most of my interlocutors expressed some connection to 
the youth implicated in the disturbance, I will devote most of my analysis 
here to that perspective. However, the views held by the small minority18 
who distanced themselves from the perpetrators of the unrest deserve 
at least passing attention, as they are no less telling of an embrace of the 
kind of collective ideal described above.
JOHN P. MURPHY
993
Among my interlocutors in Limoges’s outer city who disassociated 
themselves from the youth implicated in the fall 2005 disturbance, some 
believed the rioters’ ranks to be made up of young people, more or less 
well-known by residents and police alike in any outer-city neighborhood, 
who frequently engage in petty criminal behavior, including the con-
sumption and dealing of illicit drugs (mostly marijuana), petty theft, bur-
glary, and vandalism (car and trash can burning, graffiti, etc.). Julien,19 
a 22-year-old high school dropout who worked full-time as a stock boy 
in a pharmacy in his outer-city neighborhood at the time of my research, 
described the “rioters” this way: “They’re the ones involved in le busi-
ness [sale of narcotics as well as stolen and bootlegged merchandise]. 
Everyone’s a little scared of them. When you live here, you can’t com-
pletely ignore them, though, or they’ll make your life difficult. Especially 
for guys like me, who work for a living, who abide by the rules. But you 
gotta keep your distance as best you can.”
In the second case, “generational” differences were evoked to draw 
lines. For example, Yasmine, a 22-year-old from what many regard as 
Limoges’s roughest outer-city neighborhood, mused:
Now, what I really can’t comprehend is that these kids you see on 
television are maybe 15-years-old, maybe younger. Some people 
will tell you that it’s a form of self mutilation because they’re torching 
cars in their own neighborhoods, but I’m sorry, those cars belong to 
people they don’t know. The same thing’s happened here before. I 
really don’t think it’s a matter of self-mutilation. It’s their neighbor’s 
car, not theirs. They don’t give a damn. They torch it anyway. So, 
self-mutilation, I don’t think so. No, it’s a different generation! They’re 
too young. They’re just out to have fun, with their friends. They don’t 
care about anyone else.
In denouncing the fall conflict, both Julien and Yasmine established 
links between the rioters and groups in their own neighborhoods (de-
linquents, “kids”), whom they felt differed from them insofar as these 
groups work against the general interest in one way or another. The petty 
criminals harass honest, hardworking residents; the “kids” destroy other 
people’s property for the sheer pleasure of it. This view resembles that 
of more dominant members of society, like Jacques Chirac, for whom 
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the rioters, because of a patent refusal to embrace collective life, were 
responsible for their plight.
Unlike Julien and Yasmine, most of my interlocutors in Limoges’s 
outer city said they could at least understand the rioters’ motives, even 
if they overwhelmingly denounced the violent approach taken. For this 
majority of youth, the fall unrest was above all else a form of protest. 
Rachid, also in his early 20s and from Limoges’s largest housing project, 
had the following to say:
You can talk all you want about an outer-city crisis, about kids who 
torch cars. But wait, it makes sense! I’m not saying that it’s the 
only possible reason, you see. I’m not justifying what happened. 
It wasn’t right and it was violent, really violent. But, you’ve got to 
understand, there are kids in the outer cities who can’t take it any-
more. They can’t find work, they don’t have any money. They’ve 
had it and won’t stand for it anymore!
Youth, like Rachid, explained the fall’s unrest in terms of the social mar-
ginalization they feel most young people living in outer-city areas—includ-
ing themselves—face. Excluded from viable employment options, they 
struggle to make ends meet and see little possibility of building productive 
futures. Significantly, they framed their understandings of this marginal-
ization in terms of a more general breakdown of society’s commitment to 
collective engagement, beginning with the daily harassment they reported 
suffering at the hands of the police.
Recalling how the fall unrest began, Malik, a 24-year-old university 
student whose parents had immigrated to France from Algeria, sym-
pathized with the youth who had been electrocuted. “If you get caught 
without your papers, they [the police] can haul you off to the station 
and make you wait for hours,” he explained. “So, you try to avoid the 
police at all costs.” Later in the year, Malik recounted a recent run-in 
with the police. While talking with friends in the entranceway of one of 
the apartment buildings in his housing project, he was approached by 
a woman and two husky men in civilian clothing. Flashing badges, the 
trio demanded to see Malik’s and his friends’ identity papers and then 
searched the youths’ pockets, presumably for drugs. “There were two 
adults and a young child in the entranceway, too,” Malik explained. “But 
the police didn’t go near them. It’s always the North African kids.”
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Criticism of the police was indicative of a distrust of state officials 
more generally, including, notably, politicians. Nicolas Sarkozy in par-
ticular came under fire during the fall unrest. As Minister of the Interior 
in 2005, Sarkozy was responsible for public order and safety and was, 
therefore, directly involved in the management of the crisis. Well known 
for his hard-nosed stance against crime, expressed through his “zéro 
tolérance” policy borrowed from former New York City Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani, Sarkozy took an exclusionary line vis-à-vis the rioters, publically 
vowing to clean up this “scum” (racaille)20 with a Kärcher, a well-known 
brand of industrial-strength pressure washer. In early November, shortly 
after the conflict began, scarlet scrawls appeared on one of Limoges’s 
outer-city youth centers, declaring defiantly, “Fuck Sarkozy, him and his 
mother!” (Nique Sarkozy, lui et sa mère!), and several months after the 
riots had subsided, performers at a hip-hop concert organized by local 
youth rapped about Sarkozy, peppering their lyrics with a slogan popu-
lar among young people in France’s outer cities during the disturbance: 
“Sarko, up yours!” (Sarko, on t’encule!).21
The media in general and journalists22 in particular were also cited by 
my interlocutors as contributing to their social marginalization. The fol-
lowing passage from a recorded interview with Rachid is illuminating in 
this regard:
The image the media show, how are people going to understand 
that? If you take the United States, for example, how are they going 
to perceive outer cities in France? They’re going to say, “What sav-
ages live there!” They’re not going to realize how we really live inside. 
It’s like Franco-French people. I work as an aide (moniteur) in a high 
school in the city center, where most of the students are Franco-
French. They come from the countryside and everything. But they 
have the same ideas. They say, “Yeah, those people in the outer city 
are crazy! You can’t go into the outer city.” They think that my neigh-
borhood is really dangerous, that you’ll get your throat slit there. For 
them, it’s the same as Brooklyn or the Bronx, you see. “Yeah, you’ve 
got to be scared of those crazy people in the outer city!” they say. 
The distance between reality and what they show on TV is enormous.
For Rachid, such media representations not only reinforce a negative view 
of peripheral neighborhoods that he thinks most people in Limoges’s city 
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center share, they also contribute to a general understanding that these 
areas are intrinsically different from the rest of the city and, by extension, 
the rest of France. Indeed, by suggesting that nonresidents’ perceptions 
of outer-city areas might be the same as those of a non-French person, 
like an American, or conversely, that outsiders equate the outer city with 
Brooklyn or the Bronx, he is arguing that they see the peripheral neigh-
borhoods as not only fundamentally culturally different (foreign) but also 
dangerous. Other youth made similar comments, like Yasmine, who de-
nounced the media for likening peripheral neighborhoods to “jungles” and 
their residents to “animals.”
More than any other group, though, my informants blamed employers 
for the difficulties they face. They insisted that despite their own efforts 
to find and keep work and therefore contribute positively to society, em-
ployers do not keep their end of the social bargain, refusing them the 
jobs they and their families need to avoid marginalization and exclusion. 
Xavier’s account of a failed internship at a local supermarket meat coun-
ter is illustrative of this explanation. Suffering from the flu during his first 
week on the job, Xavier, a 17-year-old from Limoges’s eastern periphery, 
nonetheless dragged himself to work, intent on making a “good first im-
pression.” However, when his new boss saw that he was pale, sweating, 
and unsteady on his feet, he accused Xavier of using drugs. “I couldn’t 
believe it, I just couldn’t comprehend that he would accuse me like that,” 
Xavier protested. Following this incident, Xavier quit his internship and 
ultimately dropped out of school before earning his diploma. Others 
accused employers of being racist. Sofiane, the son of Algerian immi-
grants now in his 20s and living in Limoges’s largest outer-city housing 
project, recounted how he has remained jobless after finishing trades 
school, while most of his former “white” (his term) classmates are now 
employed. Similarly, Safia, who lived in the same neighborhood, said 
that she has only been able to find work cleaning houses to help support 
her family since dropping out of high school a year ago because of the 
dark color of her skin and her “Arab-sounding” last name.23
For Americans, what could seem like a refusal to accept personal 
responsibility in the cases discussed above might be seen as part of 
the problem. In this view, other factors must contribute to these youth’s 
social marginalization, not least of which their general lack of educa-
tion and employment experience. But it is important to remember that 
the kind of “pull-yourself-up-by-the-bootstraps” mentality that pervades 
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the American context is much less evident in France. As I have argued 
above, in France individual interest—but also individual responsibility—
is conceived as inextricably tied to collective interest and responsibility; 
the collectivity’s welfare is viewed as the same as each individual mem-
ber’s. What seems interesting in all of these examples, then, is the way in 
which my interlocutors cast blame. They ascribed to police, politicians, 
journalists, and employers particular qualities that are incompatible with 
this collective ideal (inasmuch as these qualities rouse conflict in society 
rather than build cohesion), but when offering such explanations, they 
were always careful to contrast such destructive behavior with their own 
willingness to work hard to support themselves and others and thereby 
partake in collective life.
If my interlocutors’ commitment to this collective ideal became espe-
cially apparent during the riots through the charges they levied against 
these various groups, no less revealing of this same commitment was the 
commentary they produced, also during the fall conflict, when position-
ing themselves distinctively as young people living in a medium-sized, 
provincial city. Although according to a map published in the national 
daily Le Monde (Bronner 2005), no less than 35 cities (including Limoges) 
witnessed destruction linked to the riots, Paris, where the violence had 
originated, was presented as the nexus of the unrest.24 Youth in Limoges 
used this understanding to offer competing representations of where 
they lived.
It is no secret that Limoges suffers a poor reputation in France, begin-
ning with its name. The verb “limoger,” which figuratively means to “dis-
miss,” “fire,” or “cashier,” was first used during World War I to refer to the 
experience of officers who were judged incompetent by their superiors 
and consequently relegated to Limoges. Today, the term is synonymous 
with disgrace (Troyansky 1996). It was thus with a snicker that Parisian 
friends told me I had been “limogé” when they learned where I would be 
conducting my fieldwork. But the perceived undesirability of Limoges 
goes deeper than mere semantics. As John Merriman has noted, 17th 
and 18th century visitors to Limoges often described the city in unflatter-
ing terms, from its “narrow,” “dark,” and “dirty” streets to its “disgusting” 
and “overwhelming” odors (1985:5-6). Little progress toward improving 
the city’s image was made in the 19th century. Limoges, it seems, was 
unable to cultivate that “pride of place” described by Stéphane Gerson 
(2003) with regard to other cities and regions. In 1821 and then again in 
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1825, when city officials applied to the king for the designation of bonne 
ville—an honorific title conferred on a number of provincial towns at the 
time—their requests were firmly denied, even as a number of smaller 
French cities earned the rank. For the municipal council, Limoges was a 
“humiliating exception” (Merriman 1985:9). The repulsiveness of the city 
and surrounding region does not appear to be entirely imposed from the 
outside. Recent anthropological scholarship investigating rural tourism 
has suggested that locals are equally critical of where they live. They are 
quick “to recite the deficiencies of the area…[and] have difficulty imagin-
ing that anyone would choose to come there” (Rogers 2002:483).
The young Limougeauds I came to know by and large shared this 
perspective. Whenever I made a new acquaintance, he or she would 
invariably ask me what someone from New York could possibly be doing 
in an as out-of-the-way place as Limoges. My interlocutors complained 
frequently about the city’s location. According to them, this “hole” (trou) 
is too far from anything of interest (the mountains, the beach) and it 
lacks activity (cultural venues, nightlife). The climate was also a subject 
of great contempt. In fact, during one particularly cold, rainy stretch in 
March, a young woman told me that Limoges’s weather was responsible 
for the city having the highest suicide rate in the nation.25
Despite such commentary, when my interlocutors discussed the fall 
2005 unrest they tended to paint a generally positive picture of where 
they lived compared to larger urban centers, especially Paris. Later in the 
year, I was talking to Olivier, a 23-year-old technician living in Limoges’s 
largest housing project. “The news at the time of the riots, they made it 
out to be a civil war,” he offered. “But I said, ‘no, it’s not a war! It’s just 
in the projects, in the outer cities.’ But here in Limoges, it’s a peaceful 
city. If I lived in Paris or Toulouse, in a project, I wouldn’t necessarily be 
able to say that.” Yasmine held a similar view: “Limoges’s outer city, it’s 
really open, not at all like Paris or some other places. There’s not that 
sense of insecurity here.” Rachid agreed: “People get along pretty well 
here. Everyone’s cool. There’s not too much racism, or stuff like that. So 
Limoges, it’s a good place to live.”
Paris, by contrast, was extremely dangerous. “Some of Paris’s outer 
cities, firefighters can’t even go into them,” Baptiste, a 26-year-old unem-
ployed outer-city resident, said. “A fire truck arrives in one of those places 
and the firemen are done for. That never happens in Limoges.” Patricia, 
a 24-year-old cashier, had an equally negative view of Paris’s peripheral 
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neighborhoods. “If you’re walking in Seine-Saint-Denis and look at some-
body the wrong way,” she suggested, “you’ll get a bullet in your head. 
Or if you don’t have a cigarette to offer, you’re as good as dead. Here in 
Limoges, it’s not dangerous. It’s nothing compared to Paris.”
If this image of Limoges-as-haven, presented in reaction to the fall 
2005 disturbance, contrasts sharply with the usual one of Limoges-as-
hole, what emerges as significant is how my interlocutors underscored 
the maintenance of social ties in their elaboration of it. They recognized 
that social life in Limoges, as in other cities, is characterized by social 
diversity in the form of status in a hierarchy, embodied most notably in an 
outer-city/city-center divide. However, they claimed that in Limoges, a 
commitment to collective engagement has mostly prevented the type of 
social exclusion they believe to exist elsewhere and to which they attri-
bute extreme forms of violence. For these youth, then, the fall unrest was 
above all else about fears of a developing underclass—fears to which 
they certainly could relate, as we saw earlier, even if they insistently re-
jected being categorized in an underclass themselves. They similarly re-
ferred to this collective ideal when discussing the CPE conflict, not as 
a basis for celebrating opposition to the proposed law as the national 
and regional media did, but rather as grounds for denouncing the forms 
taken by that opposition.
Limoges, like most other cities in France, witnessed a flurry of activ-
ity during the CPE conflict in the spring of 2006. On February 7th, the 
first of the major rallies, organized by labor unions, political parties on 
the left, and high school and university students,26 brought together an 
estimated 5,000 demonstrators, who marched through the streets of the 
city chanting derogatory slogans about Villepin (e.g., “Villepin, (you) bas-
tard, the people will have your hide!”27), brandishing makeshift banners 
denouncing job insecurity and the risk of social exclusion (e.g., “We’re 
not the Kleenex generation!”28), staging sit-ins at major intersections, 
and lighting firecrackers and blowing whistles. In Limoges, as in many 
other cities, this first demonstration was followed by a number of others, 
each one attracting an increasing number of participants, before Villepin 
finally withdrew the CPE in April. According to local newspaper esti-
mates, between 10,000 and 15,000 people turned out for the next major 
demonstration, held on March 7th; another 15,000 to 20,000 protestors 
took to the streets on March 18th; approximately 30,000 demonstra-
tors turned out on March 28th; and upwards of 40,000 Limougeauds 
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clamored against the CPE on April 4th. Few of my interlocutors, though, 
participated in any of these marches.
Initial understandings of the CPE among youth I came to know varied, 
although reactions to the proposed employment contract were almost 
always the same. On the whole, they expressed concern over the mea-
sure, but not necessarily outright hostility toward it. For them, the CPE 
was not much different from previous government initiatives meant to aid 
underemployed youth in the housing projects—some even compared it 
to the Emplois-Jeunes initiative, established by Lionel Jospin’s Socialist 
administration in 1997. This seems significant. Villepin’s proposal, in fact, 
marked a rather substantial departure from previous youth employment 
policy insofar as it did not promise employers financial support in the form 
of tax breaks or salary subsidies but instead sought to create jobs by 
loosening regulations pertaining to employee termination. This was the 
point that proved so controversial, the rallying cry of the anti-CPE demon-
strators. For my interlocutors, however, this difference seemed to matter 
little. Mostly longtime participants of past employment programs, which 
generally functioned on the basis of generating short-term employment 
contracts (like Emplois-Jeunes), they had become accustomed to a rela-
tive lack of job security and, consequently, saw the CPE as a continuation 
rather than a shift in familiar government policy. Along these lines, they 
understood the CPE as being geared specifically toward young people 
like themselves—the “jeunes en difficulté” from France’s working classes, 
who cannot find good, stable employment. And, having embraced their 
status as “jeunes en difficulté,” they tended to see job insecurity as being 
distinctively their problem and thus objected loudly to homogenizing mes-
sages about the risk of social exclusion confronting youth-in-general (la 
jeunesse) as broadcast by the national and local media at the time.
Toward mid-March, I caught up with Julien outside the pharmacy 
where he worked as a stock boy. The morning had been frenzied in 
downtown Limoges, where protesters had blocked a number of major 
intersections, tying up traffic for hours. Julien, who was one of the few 
outer-city youth I knew who had a driver’s license and owned a car, talk-
ed to me about the demonstration, complaining that it had made him late 
for work that morning:
I don’t get it. Those high school and university students don’t work. 
They don’t have any experience in the real world. So why are they 
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so concerned about the CPE? It’s not going to affect them, at least 
while they’re in school. And afterward, they’re probably going to 
get good jobs anyway. I really don’t understand it. Still, you see 
them all over France demonstrating like that.
Having left school at age 16, Julien had accumulated a long string 
of odd jobs, mostly in the construction industry, before obtaining a full-
time, long-term position in the pharmacy. “They should be thankful to 
be in school. Me, I didn’t have the same opportunities,” he suggested. 
Other youth echoed this idea. Inès, an 18-year-old outer-city high school 
dropout who had been looking for work for over three months, said: 
“Those high school kids and university students, they have it so easy. 
What do they know about work or job insecurity? They should walk a day 
in my shoes. Then they’d see.”
Whereas some young people in the housing projects, like Julien and 
Inès, avowed incomprehension over student involvement in the protests, 
others, like Olivier, who, despite having sent out, according to him, “hun-
dreds” of job applications, remained unemployed, offered possible ex-
planations for this group’s willingness to strike. Fighting social exclusion, 
however, usually did not figure among these. “When you saw all those 
high-school kids on strike, even some of the university students, I really 
don’t agree,” he commented a few months after the CPE had been re-
tracted. Olivier went on to explain that during the strikes that sometimes 
took place when he was in high school, he and his classmates did not 
always know (or necessarily care to know) what they were striking for. 
“We just wanted to skip class, have a good time.” He suspected similar 
motives among the CPE protestors. “The thing is, it was nice in April. You 
don’t want to work when you’re in high school, so the CPE was a good 
excuse for them to go on strike.” Rachid, who had a part-time job as an 
aide (moniteur) in what was widely considered a prestigious city-center 
high school, had similar doubts about the student protestors’ sincerity: 
“Most of those kids in the yuppie school where I work, they couldn’t 
even tell you what the CPE is. I should know, because I asked some of 
them. They went on strike because they were looking for an excuse to 
be outside, to skip classes.” Olivier and Rachid, like many other young 
people in Limoges’s outer city, believed that the middle class youth who 
participated in the CPE protests were motivated less by a commitment 
to social solidarity than the pursuit of individual pleasure.
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Conclusions
Focusing on two conflicts in France, I have attempted to show here how 
we can gain insight into local understandings of how the world works by 
examining the borderline between acceptable and unacceptable pub-
lic contestation. Much of my analysis has been concerned with track-
ing what makes sense to whom and why. According to dominant views 
expressed in the French media, opposition to the CPE proposal was 
legitimate but the fall conflict was not. I have argued that this is be-
cause mobilizations against the CPE corresponded to a familiar genre 
of contestation involving orderly disorder, references to past forms of 
acceptable protest, and plausible claims about safeguarding the general 
interest. The fall 2005 disturbance, on the contrary, strayed from this 
model on all of these accounts. Incomprehensible to many, it was widely 
deemed illicit.
What exactly constitutes transgression is, however, a matter of per-
spective. In contrast to mainstream views presented in the media, most 
of my interlocutors in Limoges’s outer-city housing projects could at 
least understand the fall disturbance, even if they rejected the violent 
approach taken. But like more dominant groups in France, they too drew 
on understandings of a social contract, where individual interest is ex-
pected to coincide with the national collectivity’s interest. For most of 
them, the conflict was not a result of the rioters’ unbridled individualism 
but rather the unwillingness of others, notably police, politicians, journal-
ists, and employers, to honor their end of the social contract. The follow-
ing spring, they called upon the theme of collective engagement once 
more—not to celebrate widespread opposition to the CPE as was often 
done in the national and local media at the time, but rather to denounce 
what they viewed as the student opposition’s unacceptable show of 
self-interest. Together, these perspectives suggest that a collective ideal 
functions as an important cultural logic in France, providing spaces for 
both cohesion and contestation.
In turn, this finding contributes to ongoing debates about how outer-
city youth position themselves in contemporary France. During the fall 
2005 disturbance and other periodic outbursts, youth living in France’s 
outer cities have been routinely depicted in the media and elsewhere 
as the embodiment of an assault on “traditional” French values. Such 
seemingly wanton destruction, it is sometimes argued, is irrefutable 
proof of outer-city youth’s refusal to partake in the life of the community, 
JOHN P. MURPHY
1003
to engage with the social contract. And this, it is in turn maintained, is 
a sign of their status as cultural outsiders. That many (although by no 
means all) young people living in France’s outer cities are of immigrant 
descent only serves as additional fodder for this line of argument.
Most scholars writing on the fall 2005 unrest have repudiated such 
claims, countering that the disturbance had far more to do with social 
exclusion than cultural difference. But these authors have tended to treat 
the conflict, along with previous instances of outer-city unrest, as dis-
crete events. By and large, such accounts have stressed the marginality 
of youth in the housing projects as an explanatory factor for the violence 
witnessed. By contrast, I have proposed here examining the fall 2005 
unrest from a different vantage point—that of comparison with another 
act of public contestation, which shared certain qualities with the fall 
disturbance but, unlike that event, was not viewed by the mainstream as 
transgressive. Ultimately, this approach has suggested that at least some 
outer-city youth living in a provincial city share the terms by which legiti-
mate and illicit distinctions are assessed with more dominant groups in 
France, and this is a plausible basis for claiming shared culture, in some 
sense. That there was not necessarily a clear consensus regarding how 
these terms should be applied points, I would argue, to social—and not 
cultural—differences. These youth’s alternative perspectives on the fall 
and spring conflicts were very much a function of their lower positions in 
a social hierarchy.
More generally, I hope to have shown here the value of using com-
parison to interpret acts locally defined as transgressive. My analysis 
has focused on two events in France, and the interpretations of them of-
fered by variously positioned social actors within that society. Yet, such 
an approach is apt to offer important insights into local ways of thinking 
and being, regardless of the setting or groups and events compared. 
Placing these French youth’s perspectives on transgression—and social 
life more generally—alongside those of more dominant members of so-
ciety provides a framework for understanding the modes and meanings 
of political dissent in contemporary France and beyond. ! 
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E N D N O T E S
1A number of scholars (e.g., Fassin 2006, Hargreaves 2005, Kastoryano 2006, Roy 2005) have insisted on 
the fall 2005 conflict’s historical antecedents. Although unprecedented in scope, the destruction was not 
otherwise novel. Since the late 1970s, more isolated disturbances have plagued the poorer neighborhoods 
ringing France’s largest cities. As Henri Boyer and Guy Lochard (1998), among others, have documented, 
the media have been quick to highlight periodic flare-ups, such as those on the outskirts of Lyon in 1983 
and 1990, or, more recently, in Villiers-le-Bel in November 2007, and Firminy in July 2009. The torching of 
cars, underscored by the national and international media alike during the 2005 conflict, was also not new, 
save its intensity (nearly 10,000 cars were destroyed during the disturbance). When, on November 17th, the 
National Police Directorate declared a “return to normalcy,” it did so on the grounds that “only” 98 cars had 
been torched the previous night—the routine daily national average throughout 2005.
2Because France’s urban peripheries, with their large-scale public housing projects, tend to have more 
in common with the American notion of inner city than that of suburb—which tends to evoke visions of 
middle class stability in the US—I use the term “outer city” throughout this article. There are, however, im-
portant differences. As a number of scholars (e.g., Lepoutre 1997, Vieillard-Baron 1998, Wacquant 2008) 
have pointed out, despite recent claims of “ghettoization” in France (Maurin 2004) the populations living 
on French urban peripheries are generally more racially and ethnically diverse than in the American con-
text. Under France’s social welfare model, these areas have been the beneficiaries of substantial social 
service support, even if such support has been uneven over the years with transitions between left-wing 
and right-wing governments. Further, unlike what tends to be the case in the United States, public hous-
ing in France historically has not been reserved for only the very low income; the housing developments 
constructed during the 1960s and 1970s also housed workers and lower-level salaried staff, even if such 
middle-income earners have increasingly sought private home ownership (Grillo 1985, Noiriel 1990).
3The Contrat Première Embauche (“First Hire Contract”) was essentially a new type of work contract. 
It could only be used to hire people under the age of 26 and was restricted to businesses in the private 
sector with more than 20 employees. It stipulated a mandatory two-year consolidation or “trial” period, 
during which employers would have far greater leeway to dismiss employees than under standard French 
labor law. Seen by some as an attack on France’s model of social protection, this last point proved highly 
contentious, leading to the massive opposition witnessed in spring 2006.
4According to Charles Tilly’s (1986) historical account of popular unrest in France, collective action in 
France is today generally less violent than in the 17th and 18th centuries. Thus, while “riotous” collective 
contestation during the Revolution of 1789 may have been seen as belonging to a repertoire of “normal” 
political action at the time (Rudé 1972), this is not necessarily the case today.
5Contributions by American and French scholars to an online forum organized by the Social Science 
Research Council at the time of the fall 2005 unrest are exemplary of these kinds of interpretations (avail-
able from http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org). A number of collective books have also been published expressing 
similar views (e.g., Mucchielli and Le Goaziou 2006).
6The title of a book—Émeutes urbaines et protestations: une singularité française (Urban Riots and 
Protests: A French Singularity) (Lagrange and Oberti 2006)—that appeared in late spring 2006 (shortly 
after the CPE conflict was resolved) suggests a similar approach. However, the authors, like those cited 
above, ultimately treat the fall 2005 disturbance as a discrete event rather than linking it to the CPE conflict 
or other instances of collective action in France. They stress the various “conditions” (dilapidated public 
housing, large concentrations of “minority” youth, higher-than-average rates of failure at school, out-of-
control unemployment, etc.) that, when combined at a specific moment, produced the outburst.
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7Todorov’s work has focused primarily on defining the “fantastic,” although he has also dabbled in phi-
losophy, reflecting, for instance, on Rousseau’s ideas of happiness. Carrère d’Encausse is a historian 
specializing in Russian history. Larcher was trained as a veterinarian and practiced for more than 14 years 
before being elected to the Senate in 1986.
8Terrio’s accounts, for example, are based on ethnographic research in the Paris juvenile justice system, 
later published in a book-length monograph (Terrio 2009). Her primary interlocutors were court person-
nel (judges, prosecutors, attorneys, court caseworkers, social workers, etc.). Similarly, Fassin’s (2006) 
remarks are based on fieldwork alongside crime prevention squads in an outer city.
9Such neighborhoods are generally associated in France with urban centers like Paris or Lyon, or with 
areas, like the North, that have most directly experienced the devastating consequences of industrial 
restructuring.
10In fact, it was in Limoges that the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), one of France’s most impor-
tant labor unions (long affiliated with the once-powerful French Communist Party), was founded in 1895.
11Although Limoges has never been an important destination for immigrants, immigration patterns there 
have tended to follow national trends. During the first half of the 20th century, immigrants arriving in 
Limoges came from European countries, especially Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Following World War II, 
the number of immigrants from these countries declined (except for the Portuguese); while at the same 
time, new groups began to appear from North Africa (especially Morocco and Algeria, but also Tunisia), as 
well as from Turkey (Desbordes 2004:9). Beginning in the mid-1970s with the implementation on the na-
tional level of stricter immigration policy, the number of immigrants settling in the city steadily decreased. 
However, since 1990 immigration is on the upswing again. Because of the availability of public housing 
in Limoges, many political asylum seekers (mostly from Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa) have been encour-
aged to settle there. According to 1999 census data, 5.3 percent of Limoges’s population was foreign-
born compared to 7.4 percent on the national level (Boëldieu and Borrel 2000). Within Limoges itself, most 
immigrants tend to live in the outer city. In 1999, 16.9 percent of the peripheral neighborhoods’ residents 
were foreign-born compared to 3 percent in the city center (Duplouy 2003:15).
12The idea of social exclusion emerged in France as an important theme in the second half of the 20th 
century, when some social commentators began suggesting that not everyone was reaping the benefits 
of the country’s rapid modernization. In the wake of the economic downturn of the 1970s, the concept, 
often coupled with the notion of “precariousness” (précarité), gained new currency, expressing wide-
ranging fears of a social unraveling, sometimes glossed by the term “social fracture” (e.g., Emmanuelli 
and Frémontier 2002; Farge, Lefort, and Laé 2000). These fears continue to haunt the French today, as 
evidenced by the recent republication of a number of works on the subject (e.g., Paugam 2009). An es-
pecially sizeable body of scholarship (e.g., Beaud and Pialoux 1999, Chenu 1993, Dubet 1987, Pinçon 
1988, Renahy 2005) has examined the disintegration of the working class (classe ouvrière), long held as a 
fundamental component of the French social system, as one important vector of social exclusion.
13The local press in Limoges, like the local government, has long been more or less leftist, whereas Villepin 
and the administration he headed were from the center-right.
14Some (unsuccessful) effort was made to impose these elements by trying to recruit an imam to negotiate 
with the youth responsible for the fall disturbance—as if this leadership/institution was (or could be made 
to be) behind the event giving it some kind of order.
15Chirac’s tired appearance, compounded by his choice to wear glasses instead of his usual contact 
lenses, prompted commentary on his advanced age. In fact, several news accounts suggested that he 
was all but “washed up” (e.g., Gurrey 2005).
16In her work at the Paris juvenile courts, Susan Terrio (2009) notes a trend in the treatment of delinquent 
minors toward individual accountability, restitution, and revenge, which flies in the face of the supposed 
legal guarantees in France of equality and due process. The rhetorical gymnastics undertaken by Chirac 
in this speech, the result of which corroborates Terrio’s findings, offer a clear example of how a collective 
ideal centered on the general interest can be mustered by more dominant groups in France to maintain 
and reinforce social power differentials.
17The varying interpretations of the fall unrest I encountered in Limoges are strikingly similar to those 
described in a French study (Cicchelli, Galland, and Misset 2007) conducted among youth in Aulnay-sous-
Bois several months following the disturbance.
18No single “type” of youth existed among this minority. Some were enrolled in university; others did not 
hold a high school diploma. Some had stable jobs; others were unemployed. Some were of immigrant 
origin; others were “Franco-French.” The one characteristic that they tended to share was an understand-
ing of already being “socially integrated,” whether through education, employment, or aspirations for 
Protest or Riot?: Interpreting Collective Action in Contemporary France
1006
employment. In the examples that follow, Julien held a full-time job, even if he had not graduated from high 
school. Yasmine was attending classes toward her licence (undergraduate degree) and was contemplat-
ing graduate work in sociology. Other youth, not part of this minority, also talked a great deal about social 
integration but claimed to be marginalized or excluded in one way or another.
19I have used pseudonyms throughout this paper to protect the privacy of my interlocutors.
20Youth in Limoges were especially critical of Sarkozy’s use of this term. Although within the housing 
projects, racaille in its inverted (verlan) form, caillera, sometimes designates a type of outer-city anti-
hero—those youth who are viewed with a mixture of reverence and moral ambivalence because of their 
involvement in the parallel economy—Sarkozy’s appropriation of the term was considered entirely inap-
propriate. Most of my interlocutors saw it as a “media stunt,” designed by Sarkozy to garner attention in 
preparation for his upcoming presidential bid. “Sarko, he’s got the media wrapped around his little finger,” 
Olivier, an outer-city youth, told me not long after the fall disturbance broke out.
21Consider, for example, the scene in Argenteuil (a poorer town neighboring Paris), broadcast by the 
eight-o’clock evening news (France 2) on October 26, 2005. It depicts Sarkozy as he is met by a barrage 
of stones and other projectiles, while throngs of local youth chant in unison, “Sarko, on t’encule!”
22One obstacle I frequently encountered while conducting fieldwork in Limoges’s outer city was the ini-
tial perception by residents that I was a journalist. Often it took a great deal of explaining (and time) to 
convince youth that I was not working on “just another negative news story exploiting the outer cities.”
23The question of how race is understood and used in contemporary France has of late received a great 
deal of attention. Some scholars (e.g., Fassin and Fassin 2006) have argued that the fall 2005 conflict 
signaled a change in the way French society organizes itself, with race increasingly becoming a marker 
of social and/or cultural difference. As I have argued elsewhere (Murphy 2011), this perspective was trou-
bling for my interlocutors in Limoges’s housing projects, who organized their social milieu based primarily 
on markers associated with class distinctions (income, education, networks of influence, etc.); race, ac-
cording to them, should not be a consideration in matters of public access. Thus, they loudly denounced 
proposals for the implementation of affirmative action-style policies, like blind resumes, following the fall 
2005 unrest.
24Indeed, in that same map a cutout was devoted to the incidents recorded in and around Paris, the only 
city to receive such treatment.
25She was not entirely mistaken. According to national statistics, Haute-Vienne (the department in which 
Limoges is located) is second only to Côtes d’Armor in terms of reported suicides. Officials blame this 
high rate on the area’s aging (and statistically more clinically depressed) population, though, and not its 
climate (Thomas 1999).
26A general assembly was held at the University of Limoges’s Faculty of Letters and Science on January 
31st to plan for the February 7th demonstration. In addition to university students, some high school stu-
dents and representatives of a number of unions (AGEL-FSE, SUD, UNEF, CFDT, CGT) were in attendance 
(Catus 2006a).
27“Villepin, salaud, le peuple aura ta peau!”
28“On n’est pas la Kleenex génération!” The term “Kleenex” was frequently employed by protestors and 
in anti-CPE literature distributed by labor unions and other organizations during demonstrations to evoke 
the idea of disposability. Thus, a “Kleenex generation” is a “disposable generation” and a “Kleenex job” 
(emploi Kleenex) is a “disposable job.”
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